Judicial Control of Administrative Authorities: A New Development in Eastern Europe by Wiersbowski, Marek & McCaffrey, Stephen C.
MAREK WIERSBOWSKI* AND STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY**
Judicial Control of Administrative
Authorities: A New Development in
Eastern Europe
On January 31, 1980, the Polish Parliament (Sejm) passed a statute
establishing the Supreme Administrative Court and amending the Code of
the Administrative Procedure. This statute, which entered into force on
September 1, 1980, revived judicial review of administrative decisions in
Poland, focusing attention upon the changing attitude of Eastern European
governments toward this practice. Rejected at the beginning of communist
statehood, judicial review of administrative action is slowly gaining recogni-
tion and acceptance in Eastern Europe.
I. The Changing Attitude Toward Judicial Review
in Eastern Europe
In the pre-World War II period, some Eastern European countries had a
well-developed system of judicial control of administrative action. The
system was often patterned to a great extent after the model of the Austrian
Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Supreme Administrative Court). Special tribunals
were established to review the legality of administrative actions (Verwal-
tungsakten). These tribunals were entirely separate from ordinary courts
and were authorized to decide private and criminal law cases. The strong
Austrian influence was particularly evident in the countries that had for-
merly been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire: Czechoslovakia, Hun-
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gary, and Poland. In fact, the Austrian influence extended to the entire
system of administrative law in these countries, and is discernable even
today.
After World War II, however, administrative tribunals ceased to exist in
Eastern Europe. This occurred in 1944 in Bulgaria,' in 1948 in Romania, and
in 1949 in Hungary. In Poland, after the end of the German occupation, the
Supreme Administrative Tribunal was simply not reestablished. In
Czechoslovakia the Administrative Tribunal in Bratislava was closed in
1952, but in fact had ceased to function even earlier. Article 137 of the
Czechoslovakian Constitution of 1948 provided for administrative tribu-
nals, but because no relevant statute was passed, that provision of the
Constitution has remained a dead letter.' The situation was similar in the
German Democratic Republic, where Article 138 of the 1949 Constitution
provided that administrative tribunals and Volksvertretungen (equivalent to
the USSR's "soviets") were to control the legality of administrative acts.
But no specific statute was passed and no administrative tribunals were
established.
There seem to have been several reasons for the effective abolition of
judicial review of administrative actions in these countries. For example, it
was stated that in the socialist state there are no conflicts between state
(government) and individual. The socialist government always acts in the
interest of the entire society; the interests of individuals and society are
therefore identical, and there is no room for conflict between them.3 Some
authors did not go so far in their arguments for abolishing judicial review.
They simply stated that new methods of controlling administrative bodies
wer(; sufficient or even better than "capitalistic methods." These new
methods, which were patterned after those used in the Soviet Union,
consisted of the controls exercised by procuratura," and "citizens com-
plaints." Both institutions have been fully described in American literature,'
so no further discussion of them here is necessary. A third, and related
reason given for abolishing judicial review was that administrative author-
1
P. STAINOV & A. ANGELOV, ADMINISTRATIVNOE PRAVO NARODNOI RESPUBLIKI BOLGARII (The
Administrative Law of People's Republic of Bulgaria) 481 (1960).
2Mikule, Spravni soudnictivi-ano ci ne? (Administrative Courts-Yes or No?), PRAVNIK 773
(9/1968).3Morawski, Zagadnienie knotroli administracji (The Problem of Control over Administra-
tion), PANSTWO I PRAWO (2/1947).4
"Procuratura" or procuracy is a special agency somewhat comparable to the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice in that it performs similar tasks: first, it conducts investigations in criminal cases
and acts on behalf of the state before courts in criminal proceedings; second, it supervises the
compliance with law of all governmental authorities. Other eastern European countries estab-
lished similar institutions after World War II.
5See W. GELLHORN, OMBUDSMAN AND OTHERS (1967). See also J.N. HAZARD, THE SOVIET
LEGAL SYSTEM (1977).
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ities are subordinate to the so-called "organs of state power," which are
endowed with broad powers to control the administrative authorities.
Certainly there were also other, perhaps even more important reasons. In
evaluating the activities of administrative bodies, emphasis was placed on
their "effectiveness" 6 (from the point of view of the new government, of
course), not on their legality.7 Nearly all of the statutes and laws then in
force were adopted in the pre-war period since Eastern European countries
did not abolish their existing legal systems as did Russia during its revolu-
tion. Yet administrative authorities took actions that were not always autho-
rized by the old statutes. There was thus a fear that aggrieved individuals
might attack such administrative actions by seeking judicial review.
But the abolition of administrative tribunals did not mean the abolition of
all possibilities for judicial review. In a few rare instances, statutes provided
avenues for judicial review of decisions taken by administrative agencies.
Review was performed not by special tribunals, but by ordinary courts.
These possibilities were common to all the Eastern European countries, and
also existed in the Soviet Union. Such possibilities for review were present in
the following cases: First, decisions of executive committees of local coun-
cils (ispolkomy sovetov or the equivalent) concerning insertion of a voter's
name in the list of voters; second, decisions of administrative commissions
(or the equivalent) imposing penalties;" and third, complaints of citizens to
the court concerning the contents of civil status registers (registers of births,
deaths and marriages). Other less frequent instances in which judicial
review was possible included, inter alia, social security decisions and execu-
tion by the government upon the property of citizens for the purpose of
collecting past due obligations (e.g., taxes). In some cases, expropriation of
immovable property and decisions assigning an apartment from government
owned stock were also subjected to judicial review.
Furthermore, it must be remembered that Eastern European countries
still belong to the civil law world, though the traditional civil law institutions
are clothed in a thick layer of new enactments. Thus if an administrative
action causes a citizen material losses it has always been possible to file a tort
action against the government before an ordinary court to challenge the
action as illegal. The court, in determining whether such a tort action is well
founded, must determine whether the action in question is in compliance
6
"Effectiveness" means a willingness and ability to fulfill the tasks ordered by superior
authorities.
7
M. WYRZYKOWSKI, SADOWA KONTROLI DECYZJI ADMINISTRACYJNYCH W. PANSTWIE
SOCJALISTYCZNYM (Judicial Control of Administrative Decisions in the Socialist States) 89
(Wydawnictwo Universytetu Warszawskiego 1978) (hereinafter cited as Wyrzykowski).
'On administrative commissions see Barry, The Development of Soviet Administrative Proce-




with the law. Such recourse to civil law remedies was sometimes limited by
legislative or governmental enactments, or by judicial decisions, but was
nevertheless a viable avenue for judicial review.
It must also be noted that all of these possibilities for judicial review relate
only to "administrative" actions or decisions. During the postwar period in
Eastern Europe it was not possible to challenge "normative" actions, i.e.,
actions which promulgated legal rules of general application. Also excluded
from judicial review were actions addressed to subordinate authorities and
agencies.
The only administrative actions that could be challenged by individuals
were those which allegedly caused injury to the individual in question.
Review by the court of these decisions was generally restricted to determin-
ing compliance with the law, rarely covering questions of fact.
In the late fifties the attitude in Eastern Europe toward judicial review
began to change. This development was foreshadowed by the writings of
Soviet and other authors which proposed the introduction of judicial review,
or at least an expansion of the types of cases in which judicial review could be
sought.' These proposals reflected a fundamental change in attitude toward
judicial review. But a change in the attitude of scholars does not mean an
immediate change in the position of governments. Acceptance of judicial
review by governments occurred much more slowly, and in some countries it
did not occur at all.
In 1957, Hungary became the first country to pass a statute providing for
judicial review;" Romania followed in 1967,11 Bulgaria in 1970,2 and Poland
in 1980.13 The Soviet Union slowly increased the number of cases in which
judicial review could be sought. 4 The new Soviet Constitution provided in
section 58 what appeared to be another process for judicial review stating,
"The acts of government officers violating law, overstepping their powers,
diminishing rights of citizens, can be appealed to the court in the process
established by statute." Yet no statute detailing what decisions may be
appealed to the court has been passed. This section of the Soviet Constitu-
tion remains a mere declaration of political policy.
A similar situation exists in Czechoslovakia. Statutes have been enacted
9IAMPOLSKAIA, VOPROSY SOVETSKOGO GOSUDARSTVA I PRAVA (The Problems of Soviet State
and Law) 226 (1958). Nedbailo, O iuriditcheskihgarantiahpravilnogo sushtchestvleniiasovets-
kih pravovyh norm (About the Legal Guarantees of the Realisation of Soviet Legal Norms), 6
Soy. Gos. i PRAVo 26 (1957).
"'Chapter VI of the statute IV 1957, MAGYAR KOZLONY 64/1957, later amended.
"Statute 1/1967, BULETINUL OFICIAL (Official Bulletin) 67/1967, part I.
"Statute of June 24, 1970, /DRJAVEN VESTNIK 53/1970.
13DZIENNIK USTAW 4/1980, sec. 8.
14N. SALISHTCHEVA, ADMINISTRATIVNYI PROCESS V. SSR (Administrative Process in USSR 130
(1964); 1964); N. SALISHTCHEVA, GRAZDANIN I ADMINISTRATVNAIA IURISDIKCIIA W SSR (A
Citizen and Administrative Jurisdiction in USSR) 118 et seq., (1970).
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(including a 1969 amendment to the code of civil procedure 'which presaged
the introduction of judicial review) but no regulations have been passed to
put the statutes into effect.'5 According to those who have studied this area
the German Democratic Republic has made no attempt to introduce judicial
review. 16
II. Current Situation in Eastern Europe (Other Than Poland)
A. GENERAL
Only three Eastern European countries-Bulgaria, Romania and Hun-
gary-have general statutes allowing judicial review. Of these three, only
Bulgaria and Romania provide for the right to appeal final administrative
decisions to the courts as a general rule, allowing only a few exceptions.
The Romanian statute provides for exceptions in the case of, administra-
tive decisions relating, inter alia, to the following areas: national defense,
security and public order, planning, tax and compulsory insurance, imposi-
tion of penalties, and extraordinary measures introduced in case of epidemic
or other disaster. 7 There are still other exceptions, which flow from separate
statutes.IS
In Bulgaria, the statute on administrative procedure excludes from judi-
cial review decisions relating directly to the defense and security of the state,
decisions taken according to the statute governing foreign currency ex-
change, decisions taken by the organs of state control, or so called "social"
control, and decisions excluded by some separate statutes. 9
Rather than providing a general right to judicial review subject to spec-
ified exceptions, the Hungarian law of 1957 enumerates five areas in which
judicial review is permissible: decisions refusing to include or to remove
data from registers of civil status; decisions assigning or refusing to assign an
apartment; decisions rejecting a claim for the return of property taken into
custody during an administrative proceeding; decisions pertaining to ex-
"Sec. 50 of statute no. 71 of June 29, 1967, concerning administrative procedure, Sbirka
Zakonu (the administrative code), no. 27 (1967) provided: "Special statutes delineate the
matters in which the courts are entitled to adjudicate the decisions of the administrative
authorities". See also Z. Cerveny, New Rules Governing Administrative Procedure, BUL-
GARIAN-CZECHOSLOVAK LAW, 39-56 (26/1968).
6See WYRZYKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 90.
17Sec. 14-16 of statute 1/1967.
"Gherghescu, Exceptarea de la dispozitiile Legi nr.1/1967 a actelor administrative jurisdic-
tionalesia actelor administrative pentru controlul lagalitati carora esteprevazuta a alto procedura
jurisdictionala (Exceptions from the Dispositions of Law no. 1/1967 Relating to Administrative
Judicial Acts and Administrative Acts as far as Judicial Control is Concerned are Foreseen in
Other Judicial Procedures), Revista Romana de Drept, 137 et seq. (8/1969). See also




propriation; and decisions relating to taxes. The scope of this list has been
expanded by separate statutes enacted since the statute covering general
principles of administrative procedure was adopted in 1957. In 1981 a new
statute on general principles of administrative procedure was passed, re-
placing the old law of 1957.0 This new statute does not contain a list of
instances in which judicial review is permissible but does empower the
Council of Ministers to issue an ordinance listing the areas in which judicial
review will be permitted. In comparison with the situation in 1957, the
number of instances in which appeal to the court is possible has been
substantially increased.
In the remaining Eastern European Countries (the Soviet Union,
Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic), special statutes
provide for judicial review in limited circumstances. Among these three
countries, the Soviet Union seems to allow the widest scope of judicial
review, East Germany the narrowest. Collection of the provisions concern-
ing judicial review is difficult because they are scattered throughout the
entire body of legislation. Fortunately, writings of scholars from these
countries provide some assistance.2'
B. COMMON FEATURES
In spite of the fact that different Eastern European countries permit
different scopes of review, there are several common features of the system
of judicial review of administrative actions in this region.
First, assuming judicial review is allowed, the claims on appeal are filed
with an ordinary court, not a special administrative tribunal.
Second, the procedure before the court is regulated by the codes of civil
procedure with some modifications flowing from administrative law. The
code of civil procedure in some countries, including the Soviet Union,
includes special provisions for adjudicating administrative cases.22
Third, the appeal may be filed only by a party whose rights were violated
by the administrative decision.
Fourth, only individual administrative decisions may be appealed.
Normative or rule-making acts by an administrative agency (by-laws, reg-
ulations, rules) may not be appealed. Nor will an appeal be granted to test
the constitutionality of statutes and decrees. The underlying rule prom-
ulgated by the administrative body may be attacked indirectly in some
"See Chapter VI of Statute IV 1957, supra note 10, and MAGYAR KOZLONY (107/1972).
2IN. SALISHTCHEVA, GRAZDANIN . . . , supra note 14, at 129; Studenikina, Sootnoshenie
administrativnogo i sudiebnogo kontrola v. sovietskom gosudarstviennom upravlenii (Relation
between Administrative Judicial Control in the Soviet State Administration), UTCHONYIE
ZAPISKI 75 (22/1970).
22See art. 231 to 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure of RFSSR.
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instances, however. For example, a court evaluating an administrative
decision will sometimes find that the decision was issued in accordance with
a by-law, but that the by-law violates the statute. But there are no statutes
which would allow the courts to declare the by-law to be illegal or invalid or
to set it aside. In such a case, the court might simply disregard the by-law and
inform the authority that issued the regulation of the discovered illegality.
The fifth common -feature is that in the countries having a developed
system of judicial review-and to a certain extent in the other countries
discussed-a procurator can take part in the entire procedure before the
court. The procurator is also endowed with the right to appeal the adminis-
trative decision to the court. The procurator's position when appealing a
decision is not much different than that of a citizen filing an appeal. The
procurator can appeal the decision when, in his opinion, it violates the law.
He may do so even when a party who suffers the wrong does not appeal the
decision. He is not a representative of the interest of the government, or the
public interest, but is considered and sometimes referred to as a "sentry of
legality."
Sixth, as a general principle, to which there are several exceptions, a court
finding a decision illegal may declare it void or set it aside, but cannot change
the decision. The power to change decisions or to issue new decisions is
vested exclusively in the administrative authorities. But, as has been indi-
cated, there are exceptions to this rule in several countries, including Hun-
gary and the Soviet Union. 3
Finally, decisions that are within the discretionary powers of an adminis-
trative authority are subject to judicial review, but since the scope of review
is restricted to the question of legality, the practical role of judicial review in
such cases is minimal. The American doctrines of "abuse of discretion,"
"error on the face of the record," "substantial evidence" and "arbitrari-
ness" are unknown and do not have any equivalents in Eastern Europe
administrative law.
III. Judicial Review in Poland
A. DEMISE AND REVIVAL
As mentioned earlier, the system prevailing in Poland between the world
wars allowed broad judicial review and was patterned largely after that of
Austria. Review was generally performed by the Supreme Administrative
Tribunal (Najwyzszy Trybunal Administracyjny), but was carried out in
some countries by the lower administrative tribunals. The Supreme Admin-
-rchetchot, Sudebnyi kontrol za administrativnoi deiatelnostiu v SSR (Judicial Control over
the Activity of Administration in USSR), Sov. Gos. i PRAvo 44 (1/1972).
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istrative Tribunal was not recreated following World War II. This became a
subject of criticism ' with some authors maintaining that judicial review was
still justified if not necessary.3 Article 26 of the "Little Constitution" of
Poland adopted in 1947 expressly provided for judicial review. There was
some discussion about what form judicial review would take in the future,
but it slowly died out because of the reluctance of the Polish government to
subject administrative decisions to judicial scrutiny. In the end, the govern-
ment took no steps to introduce judicial review.
The problem was raised again in 1956. In 1957 a draft of a new statute was
prepared, but it was not even discussed by the Sejm (Polish Parliament) in
plenary session. Another bill was written in the early seventies, but it met
the same fate. This does not mean that judicial review did not exist at all in
Poland during this period; there were a few instances in which it was
permitted. But overall, the situation in Poland was not much different from
that in the other Eastern European countries.
Beginning in the mid-seventies, increasing numbers of lawyers began
raising anew the question of judicial review. The discussion was given a
great boost by the sweeping reforms of local government that took place
between 1972 and 1975. The reforms not only changed the Polish local
government from a three to a two-tiered structure, but also established a
wholly new system of local administrative authorities. The entire existing
system of administrative law had to be adjusted to fit the new organization of
administrative authorities in the country. This was particularly true of the
code of administrative procedure (abbreviated K.P.A.).
During public discussion of the changes that would be required, lawyers
stressed the need for the establishment of a system of judicial review.26 A
Codification Commission was created, which prepared several drafts of the
new law on judicial review. The final draft was extensively discussed and
passed by the Sejm on January 31, 1980, less than one month before the
VIIIth Congress of the Polish United Workers Party and the change of the
Prime Minister of Poland. It is also worthy of note that the initiative to pass
the bill came not from the Council of Ministers, as usually occurs in Poland,
but from a group of members of the Sejm. The new statute, which entered
into force September 1, 1.980, is entitled the Statute on the Creation of the
'Walawski, Kontrola administracji publicanej (The Control over Public Administration),
RADA NARODPWA, 6 (23-24/1945).
'Iserzon, Praworzadnosi w administracji i kontrola legalnosci aktow administracyjnych
(Rule of Law in Administration and the Control of Legality of Administrative Acts), GAZETA
ADMINISTRACJI 6, (1-3/1945).
6Zawadzki, Teoretyczne i legislacyjne aspektyprojektu nonwelizacji k.p.a. (Theoretical and
Practical Aspects of Amending of KPA), PANSrWO I PRAwo 14 (11/1979). See also articles of
Borkowski, Jendroska, Janowicz, and Swiatkiewicz published in earlier issues of PANSTWO I
PRAWo.
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Supreme Administrative Court and Amendment of the Code of Adminis-
trative Procedure.
B. SUPREME ADMINISTRATIVE COURT (NSA)
1. Organization and Composition
The new statute creates a new court, called Naczelny SadAdministracyjny
(Supreme Administrative Court,27 hereinafter referred to as NSA). In spite
of its name, this court is inferior to the Supreme Court. There is only one
NSA, but the statute provides for the creation of sections of the NSA, called
"osrodki zamiejscowe," which will have jurisdiction for the territory of one
or more counties. Sections of the NSA have been established in Gdansk,
Katowice, Krakow, Poznan, Wroclaw and Lubin.
The number of judges to be appointed to the NSA is not set by the statute.
It is assumed that the number will depend on the volume of cases, which is
difficult to predict in advance. As of this writing there are fifty judges. The
judges hear and decide cases in panels. They are appointed by the Council of
State on nomination by the Minister of Justice. To be eligible to be a judge of
NSA, a person must be at least 35 years old, be graduated from law school,
and have been employed as a lawyer in one of the administrative agencies
for a minimum of 10 years. Full professors of law schools are exempt from
the last mentioned requirement.' A judge is appointed for life but may be
recalled if he or she resigns, passes 65 years of age, cannot perform the
duties of office because of illness, or if his or her spouse is a practicing
attorney. This last ground is based upon the concern that questions may be
raised as to the impartiality of a judge whose spouse is retained to conduct a
case before him or her. The judges of the NSA occupy a position equivalent
to that of a county court judge, but receive the same salaries as Supreme
Court judges.
The NSA has no counterpart in any other Eastern European country. As
indicated above, the ordinary courts in these countries decide appeals from
administrative decisions when judicial review is allowed. A similar solution
was proposed in Poland but at the close of the Codification Commission's
work the new system prevailed.29 The reason for the different system is that
2 The Court is called "Naczelny" as opposed to "Najwyzszy." The latter adjective is used in
the name of Polish Supreme Court (Sad Najwyzszy). Due to the lack of an equivalent
expression in English, both adjectives must be translated as "supreme."
2The titles of docent, extraordinary professor, and ordinary professor in Poland are equiva-
lent to the position of full professor in American law schools.
"The article written by two of the drafters of the bill, and published in September 1979,
proposed that jurisdiction will be vested in ordinary courts. See Zwadaxki, R. Orzechowski
Przeslanki i kierunki aktualizacji k.p.a. (The Reasons and Directions of Updating of KPA),
PANSTWO ! PRAwo (8-9/1980).
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judges sitting in ordinary courts are usually experts on civil and criminal law
while judges deciding administrative cases must have extensive knowledge
of administrative law.
C. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF THE COURT
The subject matter jurisdiction, or competence, of the NSA is limited to
the determination of the legality of administrative decisions. It may not
decide tort claims against the government or claims based on contracts
concluded with administrative agencies. These cases fall under the jurisdic-
tion of the ordinary courts. Even if a tort claim is based on harm caused by an
administrative decision set aside by the NSA, it must be brought in an
ordinary court. Therefore, two courts may decide different aspects of the
same case: the NSA will determine the legality of the administrative deci-
sion and the ordinary court will adjudicate any tort claims flowing from it.
Thus the boundary between the jurisdiction of the NSA and the other courts
remains clear.
The scope of the NSA's review of decisions of administrative authorities is
limited: Only decisions on matters listed in the newly amended code of
administrative procedure may be reviewed. This list is long, however, and
covers decisions in 20 areas of administrative law. Included in the list are
decisions authorizing the performance of a defined activity, those affecting
employment and social security, and those concerning condemnation and
other rights in immovable property. Despite the fact that the list is long,
some decisions remain immune from judicial review. These include deci-
sions on the issuance of passports and visas, those expelling foreigners from
Polish territory, and decisions relating to the army (e.g., concerning con-
scription).
D. RIPENESS, STANDING AND APPEAL
A number of conditions must be met before an administrative decision
can be reviewed by the NSA. First, the decision must be ripe for review.
That is, except where review is sought by the procurator, all possibilities of
appealing the decision to the superior administrative authorities must be
exhausted. Second, review may be sought only by a party to the procedings
before the administrative authority, a person whose legally protected in-
terests are at stake, a so-called "social organization" (a club or an associa-
tion) which took part in the proceedings, or the procurator. Third, the
decision may be appealed by a party other than the procurator within 30
days from the moment of delivery to the party or the time of oral announce-
ment. The procurator may appeal decisions any time within six months, and
may act either in favor of or against a party to the proceedings.
VOL. 18, NO. 3
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An appeal notice must be delivered to the administrative authority that
issued the contested decision. This authority must, in turn, deliver the notice
and the entire record of the case within 30 days to NSA. The administrative
authority has the option to change or cancel its original decision if it
considers the grounds of appeal to be just on the whole. In that instance the
authority does not forward the notice with the record, but renders a new
decision which amends or cancels the old one. This new decision, however,
is still subject to judicial review.
E. PROCEEDINGS
In the proceedings before the NSA, the administrative agency becomes
the defendant. The procurator may also take part in the proceedings, but he
is not a party. His position resembles, to a certain extent, that of the
Commissaire du gouvernement in France. The case is decided after a public
trial. The procedure before the NSA is governed by the provisions of the
code of civil procedure. The NSA is not restricted to examining the ques-
tions raised in the claim, but is to examine the legality of the entire decision.
For example, when a party claims that the administrative decision violates a
statute, the court may set the decision aside because of procedural problems
even if the party did not raise the issue on appeal.
The NSA must set the decision aside if it finds that the law was violated.
Such a violation may include procedural errors if they had an effect on the
decision. In some instances, the court may declare a decision invalid, as
contrasted with setting it aside. The degree of hardship caused by the errors
committed by the administrative authority determines whether a decision
should be set aside or declared invalid. From the point of view of the party
and the defendant agency, the result is the same: the decision simply does
not exist any more.
The new law also contains a statute of limitations for appeals to the court.
A decision may not be set aside after five years or declared invalid after ten
years. After the expiration of these periods the court may declare that the
decision violates the law, yet it remains in force. In view of the fact that a
decision must be appealed within 30 days, this provision may find use only
where an agency neglects to inform the aggrieved party of its decision.
As indicated above, decisions declared to be in violation of the law-as
distinguished from those declared invalid or set aside-remain in force. The
party adversely affected by the decision may bring an action in tort for
damages before an ordinary court.
The NSA has no power to issue a new decision or to amend the decision
under review. These powers are vested exclusively in the administrative
agencies. The court's decisions on questions of law are, however, binding on
the agencies. Furthermore, the new statute provides that the court may
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order an agency to make a decision without prescribing the decision's
contents. This may occur, for example, when a party complains to the NSA
that an agency did not issue a decision within the statutory time limit for
issuance (usually one or two months).
The NSA judgment is final, and not subject to appeal by the parties. The
Minister of Justice, First President (Chief Justice) of the Supreme Court and
the Procurator General may, however, bring an extraordinary appeal
(called rewizja nadz-wyczajna). The parties will usually petition the Minis-
ter of Justice, the Chief Justice, or the Procurator General to make an
extraordinary appeal. The extraordinary appeal may be made only when the
administrative judgment clearly violates the law or the interest of the state.
It is within the scope of the discretionary powers of these authorities to make
an extraordinary appeal. Once an appeal has been made, the Supreme
Court must review the judgment of the NSA. Occasionally, an administra-
tive decision is issued in accordance with an administrative regulation (by-
law), but the party claims nevertheless that the decision violates the statute
because the regulation is itself illegal. As is typical for the Eastern European
countries, the court does not have the power to declare the regulation
illegal. But the NSA does have the option of disregarding the regulation.
The statute provides in article 4: "Judges are independent in making their
decisions, and are subordinated only to the statutes." Therefore, the NSA
should apply the statute and disregard the regulation (by-law) when it
conflicts with the statute. In such a case the court has the duty to inform the
defendant agency and the superior authority for that agency that the regula-
tion violates the statute.
F. THE ROLE OF THE NSA AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
1. Role Expansion
The scope of jurisdiction of the NSA has been expanded twice. First in
1981, a new statute on the control of the press and publications"' was enacted
which provided that decisions banning printed matter may be appealed to
the NSA. In 1982 a new statute on universities31 was passed, permitting
universities to appeal some ministers' decisions to the courts. Both statutes
were enacted as a result of strong public pressure. The right to appeal
decisions concerning censorship was granted by the government in a 1980
agreement concluded by government representatives with striking workers
in the Gdansk shipyard. In the same agreement many other concessions
were made by the government, inter alia, the right to organize free trade
I0DZIENNIK USTAW (20/1981).
31DZIENNIK USTAW (14/1982).
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unions. The new law on universities was drafted principally by university
professors. These two examples demonstrate popular support for the idea of
judicial review by the NSA of administrative action.
2. Martial Law
On the other hand, the government seems reluctant to introduce ex-
panded judicial review. In fact, it sometimes seems that it is eager to narrow
the scope of judicial review. The decree on martial law passed on December
12, 1981 excluded judicial review of decisions taken pursuant thereto. Later,
when the decree was confirmed by a special statute, the parliament added
the right to seek judicial review. But there have been very few cases in which
judicial review of administrative decisions taken pursuant to the decree on
martial law has been sought. This is due to the fact that most of these
decisions are within the discretionary powers of the administrative author-
ities, restricting the role of the court to determine whether these decisions
are within the limits of the authority's power. People realize this fact and
thus in most cases have not sought review by the NSA. For this reason, the
period of martial law was not marked by any special developments in the
decisions of the NSA.
Nevertheless, the NSA plays an important role in Polish administrative
law. Several of the court's decisions show that it considers itself to be fairly
independent. When faced with the choice between the positions taken by
scholars and the practice of administrative agencies, the court frequently
rejects well established practice when it considers it to be unjust.
3. Shaping of Judicial Review: NSA Decisions
Before the NSA was established, there was no supreme body endowed
with the power to interpret statutes and rule on how they should be applied.
Every minister was the ultimate judge and supervisor of the administrative
authorities under him, and could direct the manner in which administrative
law was to be applied by the subordinate authorities. His interpretation was
sometimes different from that of other ministers. Because of the high degree
of centralization in Polish public administration, ministers felt quite free to
determine what the law was. Sometimes they did so in disregard of existing
statutes. This was usually done by issuance of circulars which were delivered
only to subordinate authorities. The officers of the local authorities are
almost entirely subject to the ministers' will. If they found a circular to be in
conflict with a statute they would apply it, since if they disregarded it they
could easily be punished.
On the other hand, many professors of administrative law suggested
interpretations that were different from those of the ministers. The conflict
related mostly to the question of the scope of the ministers' powers to
restrict citizens' rights. This question was presented in some of the cases
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brought before the NSA. In a case involving the rights and duties of
cooperative associations,32 the court found that a resolution of the Council of
Ministers taken without special statutory authorization cannot increase the
duties of citizens or private organizations. And in another case, the NSA
found that a circular issued by a county chief of administration (wojewoda)
may not determine the contents of an administrative act.33
NSA decisions are landmarks in the development of other aspects of
Polish administrative law as well. For example, the court set aside an
administrative decision because the presiding officer failed to inform a party
about important legal and factual questions involved in the case.' The NSA
found that lack of this information could have substantial influence on the
final decision of the administrative authority. It held that in accordance with
the code of administrative procedure, the presiding officer should inform
parties about all questions of fact and law involved in a case.
In another case the court found an administrative decision invalid because
it was taken not by the body prescribed by a statute but by a superior
authority. Until this decision was rendered, it was a common practice that a
superior authority considered itself authorized to issue decisions on matters
over which inferior authorities were competent.35
Very important during the martial law period in Poland was a case
concerning the right of civil servants to seek judicial review of decisions
concerning their employment. The NSA found judicial review permissible,
but this holding was overruled by the Supreme Court of Poland.36 Since this
decision of the Supreme Court, it has been considered that a civil servant
released from his or her position cannot appeal that decision to the NSA.
In spite of the fact that the jurisdiction of the NSA is very limited, the
number of cases it has decided is quite impressive. In 1982 the NSA decided
a total of 8,738 cases. This was the product of less than 50 judges sitting in
panels of three and explains why judges complain about having an overload
of cases.
IV. Summary
After the turn of history which brought about the change of the systems of
government in the Eastern European countries, there was a great deal of
reluctance to allow judicial review of administrative decisions. In fact,
existing administrative tribunals were abolished. This mood began to
32Decision of the N.S.A., no. SA 819/81.
33Decision of the N.S.A., no. SA 2769/81.
34Id.
35Decision of the N.S.A., no. SA Gd. 12/81.
'Joint decision taken by the Chamber of Labor and Social Security and the Chamber of Civil
and Administrative Law of the Supreme Court, March 1, 1983.
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change in the late fifties with some countries allowing judicial review for
limited types of administrative decisions. Bulgaria and Romania introduced
a broad system of judicial review. Some countries, particularly Czechoslo-
vakia and the German Democratic Republic, have such limited judicial
review of administrative decisions that the concept is almost non-existent.
And even in the countries having broad judicial review, certain types of
cases are still excluded from the court's jurisdiction.
The Polish statute providing for judicial review is the only one of its kind
in Eastern Europe. Poland does not follow the pattern of other Eastern
European countries which grant jurisdiction to review administrative deci-
sions to the ordinary courts. Instead it follows the tradition of continental
Europe, creating a supreme administrative court (the NSA) to review
administrative decisions. The Polish statute is rather unique in the manner
in which it separates the jurisdiction of the NSA from that of the ordinary
courts. The NSA determines only the legality of the administrative de-
cisions; any actions against administrative authorities are left exclusively to
the ordinary courts, even if the harm was caused by an illegal administrative
decision.
It is difficult to predict what influence the new Polish statute will have on
the development of administrative law in the remaining Eastern European
countries. It must be recognized that the social and political unrest that has
shaken Poland since the beginning of the 1980's makes the rest of communist
Europe rather hesitant to adopt Polish legal solutions. But the new statute
would seem to be a salutory development, if only because of the principle it
represents, and is one that should be of interest to observers abroad.
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